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1. INTRODUCTION 
Rather than comment in great detail on the 
specific content of the papers included in this 
symposium I propose to make some observa- 
tions on issues of a more general nature arising 
from the subject matter of the symposium. I 
will begin by suggesting an explanation for 
the apparent decline of development economics 
since its heyday in the 1960s. I will then 
consider the impact of development economics 
on the general body of the discipline of 
economics. Finally, I will illustrate some 
of my points with specific reference to the 
empirical work discussed in Hollis Chenery’s 
contribution.’ 
My perspective is that of a radical political 
economist, whose interest in Third World 
development was first stimulated in the early 
1960s by a year spent in India, and whose 
conversion to a radical outlook was consolidated 
both by the experience of working on economic 
planning problems in India and by the political 
and intellectual camaraderie of colleagues in 
the Union for Radical Political Economics 
(URPE) in the United States in the late 1960s. 
2. THE DECLINE OF DEVELOPMENT 
ECONOMICS 
In a recent and stimulating essay, Albert 
Hirschman has suggested that development 
economics is a field in decline : although ‘articles 
and books are still being produced . . the old 
liveliness is no longer there . . . and the field is 
not adequately reproducing itself’.2 This 
admittedly subjective judgement strikes me as 
accurate, as least for the United States. With 
some notable exceptions, such as my co- 
panelists at this session, there are few prominent 
economists working in the field; a number of 
major US graduate economics programmes are 
having difficulty staffing their development 
courses; and the graduate students themselves - 
other than those of Third World origin - are 
increasingly shifting their interest to other fields 
of specialization. Why has this happened? 
There are no doubt many possible answers, 
and Hirschman in his essay has proposed some 
very plausible elements of an explanation. Here 
I would like to propose another such element 
that I believe to be an important part of the 
story. In brief, I believe that the apparent 
decline of development economics is linked to 
the general decline of the liberal centre in 
economics and politics during the last 1 O-l 5 
years. 
Like Keynesianism and the welfare state, the 
theory and practice of development economics 
has been largely a liberal project (of course in 
the modern, not the classical, sense of ‘liberal’). 
As Hirschman has also observed, Keynesian 
economics had an important influence on the 
new development economics that arose in the 
1950s. Both schools of economic thought share 
certain important features; e.g. the idea that 
structural disequilibria in market economies 
render laissez-fhire economics and the market 
mechanism inadequate as a basis for economic 
activity, and the implication that a (presumably) 
neutral and beneficent state would have to play 
a judiciously active economic role in guiding 
and supplementing the market. This perspective 
opens up a very substantial role for skilled 
technocratic economic advisers, who are needed 
both to instruct political leaders on how to 
guide the economy and to carry out the detailed 
economic calculations needed to determine 
what the market fails to show as a matter of 
course. In the advanced capitalist nations these 
implications of Keynesian economics led to 
public policy activism and macroeconomic fine- 
tuning. In many developing nations the same 
implications of development economics led to 
increasingly elaborate development plans and 
(social) benefit-cost analyses. Needless to say, 
these developments attracted many economists 
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to advisory roles in government and many 
students to the disciplines of Keynesian and 
development economics. 
This overall liberal-interventionist orientation 
reached its heyday in the United States in the 
1960s. On the domestic front, the ‘New 
Economics’ and the ‘War on Poverty’ swung 
into high gear under the relatively activist 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations. In the 
international arena, the US Government stepped 
up its foreign aid and technical assistance 
programmes in many parts of the Third World, 
exporting American goods and personnel and 
promoting more systematic economic planning 
and decision-making in both the United States 
and overseas. Economists and politicians were 
confident that a new era of stable prosperity in 
the centre and balanced development in the 
periphery of the capitalist world was underway. 
Subsequent events have of course dashed 
those expectations; neither the Keynesian nor 
the development economics activists achieved 
their desired and predicted results. The advanced 
capitalist economies stumbled into stagflation 
in the 1970s and into deepening recession in 
the 1980s. While some developing nations 
showed impressive aggregate rates of economic 
growth in the 1960s and 197Os, many did not; 
and almost all experienced mounting economic 
problems of inequality and unemployment as 
well as persistent political tensions linked to 
authoritarianism and repression. Now these 
unsatisfactory results were not primarily 
attributable to the liberal activist policies and 
programmes pursued at the behest of the 
Keynesian and development economists 
(although one can discern some links in some 
cases). Nonetheless, in no small part because 
they had promised so much that could not be 
achieved, the liberals and their programmes 
became increasingly discredited. And, pari 
passu, both Keynesian and development 
economics - as they had developed up to the 
1960s - became increasingly vulnerable to 
attack from both the right and the left. 
To the economists of the right, the setbacks 
of the liberal centre were both easily explained 
and readily overcome. The basic premise of 
both Keynesian and development economics - 
that the market is an inadequate guide to 
economic activity - was fundamentally mis- 
taken. The market could and would do the job, 
if only given the chance. Thus what was needed 
was mainly to get the state - and its liberal 
economic advisers - off the market’s back. 
Instead of working on development plans 
and economic analyses designed to enable 
government agencies to overcome ostensible 
structural disequilibria and social problems, 
economists should disengage from the public 
sector and - if bent on departing academia for 
the ‘real world’ - make their expertise available 
to private enterprises operating in an unfettered 
market environment. Keynesian and develop- 
ment economics should properly be left to 
historians of economic thought, and orthodox 
neoclassical economics would resume its pride 
of place as the discipline most relevant and 
useful both to advanced and to developing 
capitalist economies. 
For reasons having much more to do with 
politics and ideology than strictly intellectual 
competition, this message from the right has 
gained much ground in the United States in the 
last decade. But the demise of the liberal centre 
also opened up a new opportunity for critics 
from the left, who have been able to get a 
hearing for views that used to be dismissed out 
of hand. From this perspective the shattered 
expectations of the liberals are also quite readily 
explainable, but the conclusions drawn are of 
course very different - and, to my mind, much 
more persuasive. 
Viewed from the left, liberal technocratic 
advisers are not in a postion to guide a 
beneficent state looking after the general public 
interest. Rather, they are largely prisoners of 
the political powers-that-be. Policy is ultimately 
shaped most by those who have the greatest 
economic and political resources at their 
disposal, and they do not share the public 
interest in sustained full employment or 
equitable growth. Thus, before there can be a 
progressive role for economists, people must 
struggle in the political arena to change the 
balance of power. Once again - but for a 
very different reason - the role of the liberal 
economists/planners/advisors becomes largely 
superfluous, and the body of Keynesian and 
development economics designed to serve them 
loses its relevance and appeal. 
Instead of devising economic plans and 
policies for governments that lack the political 
base to carry them out successfully, economists 
should contribute - by fostering greater 
understanding and/or participating in political 
action - to movements for fundamental 
change. In so far as Third World development is 
at issue, economists from the advanced capitalist 
nations are somewhat limited by their inability 
as foreigners to become directly involved in the 
politics of Third World nations. Thus their role 
is necessarily limited to academic research and 
to political action aimed at the international 
economic and political policies of the major 
powers, in so far as these have a significant 
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impact on development in the Third World. 
Either way, development economics - as it 
arose in the 1950s and 1960s - loses its 
significance; what is required is not a program- 
matic economic policy orientation but a much 
more fundamental and interdisciplinary analysis 
of the historical, social, political and economic 
forces that shape the environment in which 
development takes place and that condition the 
possibilities for change. 
3. THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT 
ECONOMICS 
Whatever its success or failure in promoting 
economic development in the Third World, the 
new subdiscipline of development economics 
might have been expected to have some impact 
on the intellectual development of the discipline 
of economics as a whole. As Paul Streeten has 
noted, there are indeed numerous examples of 
analyses originally formulated by development 
economists in the context of Third World 
economies which have subsequently been found 
relevant to advanced capitalist economies as 
well - e.g. theories of dual or segmented labour 
markets and theories of structural inflation.3 
Beyond such cases of economic analysis in- 
formed by certain institutional realities, it 
was to be hoped that the study of economic 
development in the context of Third World 
societies would help to broaden the scope of 
economics in general in at least two significant 
respects. 
First, by displaying examples of the diversity 
of historical experience and socioeconomic 
potential, studies of Third World societies 
could raise fundamental questions about the 
purpose of economic growth. Second, by 
demonstrating the manifest interdependence of 
political, social and economic factors in the 
development process, such studies could 
demonstrate the importance of multidisciplinary 
analysis. As it happened, however, development 
economics did not focus much attention on 
these kinds of issues, and the main body of 
economics was largely unaffected by them. It 
was left to the more iconoclastic development 
economists and to radical political economists 
to bring such issues to the fore. 
With respect to the objectives of economic 
development, most development economists 
did not challenge the conventional economists’ 
view that the main goal was a rapid increase in 
per capita national product or consumption. 
While many saw development an entailing 
significant shifts in the sectoral pattern of 
production and trade, and some were concerned 
about the distribution of gains from economic 
growth, few thought it relevant for economists 
to worry about promoting ‘social’ goals other 
than increased material welfare. Only a small 
and radical minority of economists raised 
broader ethical issues and sought to define the 
purpose of development in social as well as 
economic terms - arguing the importance of 
such objectives as social and political equality, 
the development of communitarian rather than 
individualistic patterns of life and work, the 
fostering of ecological balance (between people 
and nature) and psychological balance (between 
the material and the spiritual), and the 
promotion of cultural and institutional diversity 
rather than the remaking of the Third World in 
the image of the advanced capitalist societies. 
Why should emphasis be placed on develop- 
ment as a social as well as an economic 
transformation? Economists are usually content 
to concentrate on narrowly-defined economic 
issues and to let other issues take care of 
themselves (or be analysed by other social 
scientists). But evidence from both rich and 
poor societies suggests that gains in economic 
performance do not necessarily lead to any 
corresponding gain in people’s general welfare; 
indeed, economic advances often give rise to 
many new problems - such as economic in- 
security, ecological damage, cultural dependence 
or demise - even when they help to solve old 
ones. Economic progress can in principle 
facilitate broader human progress, but in 
practice it has often had a contrary effect. 
Moreover, even if and when sustained economic 
growth is likely to be beneficial, there is good 
reason to doubt that today’s developing nations 
could follow the path of the advanced capitalist 
nations to their current levels of economic well- 
being, given the finite nature of the earth’s 
resources and the extent to which economic 
advance in the rich nations has historically been 
dependent on their dominant relationship with 
the poor. 
As for the role of multidisciplinary analysis, 
most economists working on development 
problems found it difficult to shed the blinkers 
imposed by their training in a discipline that 
was itself becoming steadily more inward- 
looking. The economic problems of developing 
nations are manifestly intertwined and social 
and political forces that beg for an institutional 
and political-economic analysis. (The same is 
true, but often less obvious, in richer nations.) 
Yet, with some notable exceptions as always, 
development economists succumbed to 
the professional drive to compartmentalize, 
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formalize and specialize, reacting to their 
position on the fringe of the economics 
discipline much less often by asserting their 
own uniqueness than by seeking to show their 
respectability as trained economists. Far from 
encouraging the profession as a whole to 
broaden the scope of its analysis, they lent 
support to the professions’s vested interest in 
carving out a narrow sphere of arcane expertise. 
This is not to say that development economics 
has had no salutary effect at all. On the plus 
side, economists studying Third World develop- 
ment experiences have in recent years helped 
to promote greater concern for some objectives 
other than aggregate economic growth. To 
people like Hollis Chenery and Paul Streeten, as 
well as many radical political economists, we 
are indebted for the growing attention paid to 
the distributional consequences of economic 
growth and for the formulation of policies 
designed to promote greater equity and to 
provide for ‘basic needs’. To people like Albert 
Hirschman and Gunnar Myrdal, as well as many 
radical political economists, we are indebted 
for insightful analyses of development issues 
that link together integrally the political and 
economic forces at work. 
But, on the negative side, these contributions 
have simply not had much effect on the 
economics profession at large (at least not in 
the United States). Relatively few economists 
are concerned with anything but growth and 
efficiency, and - as I have already noted - the 
profession is becoming less rather than more 
open to integrating economics with other 
disciplines. Even in the development field itself, 
these tendencies are apparent. As a consequence, 
some of the most interesting work on develop- 
ment issues is now being done not by orthodox 
economists but by historians, political scientists 
and sociolo@sts, as well as by radical political 
economists. 
4. COMMENTS ON HOLLIS CHENERY’S 
ARTICLE 
In discussing ‘The Interaction Between 
Theory and Observation in Development 
Economics’, Chenery provides a useful review 
of the theoretical development and empirical 
application of neoclassical growth theory. 
Using this framework many studies have sought 
to explain the sources of aggregate economic 
growth, both in rich and in poor economies. 
Chenery’s Figure 1 presents the results of some 
of the recent studies in a particularly instructive 
form. As he observes, the typical high-income 
economy displayed relatively low factor input 
growth with somewhat higher total factor 
productivity growth, while the typical middle- 
income developing economy sho.wed higher 
factor input growth but somewhat lower total 
factor productivity growth. Most interesting 
was the evidence of high factor input growth 
combined with exceptionally high total factor 
productivity growth for a distinct group of 
outliers: Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, South 
Korea, Spain and Taiwan. These countries are 
all, of course, among the postwar success stories 
of rapid overall economic growth. 
Chenery is rightly sceptical about the ability 
of standard versions of the neoclassical growth 
model to capture the ‘disequilibrium’ effects 
that are especially likely to influence growth 
rates in the Third World economies (in this 
respect he echoes the development economist’s 
critique of neoclassical economic orthodoxy 
for its typical assumption of market-honed 
equilibrium). He reports very favourably on the 
efforts of G. Feder at the World Bank to go 
beyond the usual neoclassical variables by 
including in a comparative study of growth 
performance (from the early 1960s to the 
mid-l 970s) such ‘disequilibrium’ variables as 
(1) the shift of resources out of the agricultural 
sector; (2) the rate of growth of exports; and 
(3) other (unspecified) measures of structural 
change. Inclusion of these variables leads to a 
substantial improvement in the explanatory 
power of cross-country growth equations, and 
~ in particular - accounts for the otherwise 
unexplained gap between the outlying cases of 
especially rapid growth and the remaining 
countries in the sample. 
Chenery’s and Feder’s effort to break out of 
the neoclassical mould, in the light of evidence 
of structural disequilibrium in Third World 
economies, is certainly laudable. But the 
scope of the additional explanatory variables 
considered remains regrettably narrow: like the 
basic neoclassical variables representing factor 
inputs, the added structural variables are still 
purely economic in character. Moreover, their 
ability to explain differences in economic 
growth performance is suspect, for there 
appears to be a significant potential for reverse 
causality in the basic regression equation for 
economic growth. It seems at least as likely 
that a relatively rapid shift of resources out of 
agriculture, and a relatively rapid growth of 
exports, could be the consequence rather than 
the cause of relatively rapid economic growth. 
Thus the basic reasons for the growth per- 
formance of the postwar success stories may 
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remain concealed in variables omitted from the 
specification of the structural equation. 
On the basis of work on productivity growth 
in the US economy that I have carried out 
jointly with Samuel Bowles and David Gordon,’ 
I would suggest that studies of aggregate 
economic growth performance need to pay 
much more attention to the social and political 
variables that affect the growth process. (In this 
respect I am simply following the radical 
political economist’s injunction to undertake 
multidisciplinary rather than narrowly economic 
analysis.) More specifically, I believe that 
degree of success in the growth performance of 
capitalist economies is likely to be positively 
related to such factors as: (1) the ability of 
capitalists to maintain control over their 
workers, which is in turn a function of the 
political and legal constraints imposed on 
worker organization and action; (2) the extent 
to which the character of labour-management 
relations encourages worker effort and 
cooperation on the job; (3) the degree to which 
feudal or other forms of pre-capitalist agrarian 
social relations have been eliminated; (4) the 
degree to which positions of privilege and 
power are held by newly arrived classes and 
individuals rather than by representatives of 
long-standing networks of vested interest and 
power; and (5) the extent to which a nation’s 
political alliances have afforded it external 
economic and technical assistance. 
These kinds of variables are admittedly 
difficult to quantify, and that may help to 
explain why they are so rarely admitted into 
statistical analyses of economic growth. But the 
effort is surely worth making. For one thing, 
none of them appears to be as vulnerable to 
problems of reverse causality as the economic 
structural variables discussed earlier. More 
importantly, the unusually strong growth 
performance of each of the six success stories 
identified by Chenery appears to be explainable 
in terms of unusually high values for a subset of 
the five growth-favouring social and political 
variables listed above. During the relevant time 
period, Hong Kong scored high on (3) and was, 
by any reckoning, rather a special case; Israel 
was high on (3), (4), (5) and - in some 
sectors - (2); Japan was high on (3), (4) and - 
to a degree - (2); South Korea was high on 
(l), (3), (4) and, in the early postwar years, 
(5); Spain was high on (1) and - in the Basque 
area - (2); and Taiwan was high on (l), (3), 
(4) and, in the early postwar years, (5). 
To summarize: the kind of growth studies 
favoured by Chenery are helpful in discrediting 
narrow-minded assumptions about the universal 
applicability of simple neoclassical models. 
As a development economist familiar with 
conditions in the Third World, he has appro- 
priately stressed that such neoclassical models 
are (even) less applicable to developing 
economies than to more advanced capitalist 
economies. But Chenery’s approach still remains 
constrained by a trained economist’s view of 
the world. As I have suggested,such an approach 
is insufficiently informed by a multidisciplinary 
perspective. More generally, it does not even 
raise the broader question of the purpose of 
development that I emphasized earlier. Indeed, 
by concentrating attention on economic growth 
performance and by seeking to explain cross- 
country differences largely in terms of variations 
in a limited set of economic variables, this 
approach tends to reinforce the false notion 
of an underlying similarity in development 
experience and development potential across 
all societies and systems. 
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